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In this issue: Contracts • Due Process • Eligibility • First Amendment • Individuals with Disabilities • Liability • Negligence • Qualified Immunity • Retaliation • Statute of Limitations • Sunshine Law • Title VII
Ohio court of appeals holds that district is not liable for costs of unused concert tickets after superintendent cancels concert due to promoter’s failure to submit proof of insurance.
Taylor v. Herring, 2014-Ohio-5638.
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/7/2014/2014-ohio-5638.pdf
In 2011, Terrance Smitherman, the owner of T&T Promotions, contacted the principal at East Liverpool High School for permission to use the school for a concert featuring the rap artist Bow Wow. The principal tentatively approved the concert and scheduled it for November 5, 2011. Smitherman began promoting the concert and tickets were sold at East Liverpool High School.
In October 2011, Mark Reed, the Director of Buildings and Grounds for the district, prepared and executed a contract with Smitherman granting him the right to use the facilities on November 5. The contract specifically required Smitherman to provide proof of liability insurance coverage prior to the event. When the school board hadn’t received proof of liability insurance by November 1, Reed told Smitherman that the permission to use the high school would be revoked if such proof was not delivered by November 3. The deadline passed with no submission of proof of insurance. The superintendent immediately revoked the right to use the high school and the concert was cancelled. Smitherman promised to refund the money to those who had purchased tickets, but reneged on this promise.
In July, Guy Taylor filed a small claims action in East Liverpool Municipal Court against Smitherman and the superintendent seeking a refund for the seven $35 tickets he purchased. At the start of the hearing, the board of education was substituted in place of the superintendent as party defendant. The court found in favor of Taylor. The court held that the district had violated RC 1345.02 by deceptively selling tickets prior to the fulfillment of the contractual preconditions for the use of the facilities. The court also determined that the district was in privity of contract with the promoter by virtue of a joint venture because it was sharing in the profits of the event and that the district had been negligent in waiting two months before requiring proof of insurance. The district appealed.
On appeal, the board argued that it was never made a party to the action and could not be held liable. The board also argued that, as a political subdivision, it was immune from prosecution for an alleged violation of RC 1345.02 or for negligence in deciding how to use school facilities. The district also argued that it could not be liable for breach of contract for participating in a joint venture because it was constitutionally prohibited from entering into a joint venture with a private business. The court of appeals agreed with the district on all counts and reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Delaware district court holds that applicant’s expectation in employment despite poor background check results was unreasonable and failed to demonstrate a property interest.
Williams v. Christina Sch. Dist., Del No. 13-1525-LPS (Dec. 31, 2014).
In March 2012, Lisa Williams began working as a secretary for Stubbs Elementary School in the state of Delaware. As part of her employment, Williams was required to provide a background check within thirty days of her hire. Williams had been convicted of misdemeanors, a fact of which she believed the district was aware due to her prior employment with the district. Upon completion of her background check, Williams was called into a conference room and informed that due to her unsatisfactory background check, she was no longer an employee of the district. She received no additional information about why she was being fired, despite her efforts to obtain it. Williams filed suit in September 2013, alleging, among other things, that the district had violated her right to due process.
The court reviewed William’s due process claim under a two-stage inquiry: 1) whether the asserted individual interest was encompassed within the fourteenth amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or property; and 2) whether the procedures available provided the plaintiff with “due process of law.” In this case, the court found that the property interest on which Williams relied was her expectation in continued employment with the district. The court found that Williams alleged little if anything more than her unilateral expectation of continued employment despite the results of her background check. The court held that her mere expectation failed to demonstrate a property interest and failed to overcome the “heavy presumption” under state law that employment, unless otherwise expressly stated, is at-will in nature. As a result, the court dismissed William’s due process claims for failure to state a claim due to the failure to allege a protected property interest.
Ohio court rules that disabled student may not be excluded from participating in athletic programs regulated by OHSAA due to residency.
Steines v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Assn., S.D. Ohio No. 1:14CV525 (Nov. 10, 2014).
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8489539483057271523&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr
Charles Steines is a resident of Villa Hills, Kentucky, but has attended school in Ohio since first grade. He attended school in Ohio so that he could attend a school equipped to address his learning disabilities. He was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and an auditory processing issue. His parents sent him to the Springer School in Cincinnati, Ohio because it was the best educational setting for Charles. His parents then enrolled him at St. Ursula Villa in Cincinnati for his seventh and eighth grade years. While attending St. Ursula Villa, Charles played on the school’s soccer team. Charles was subsequently enrolled to attend high school at the Summit Country Day School (Summit) in Cincinnati.
Charles’ parents began researching whether he could play soccer for Summit when he finished St. Ursula Villa. Summit is a member school of the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA). OHSAA denied a request for an accommodation for Charles to play soccer at Summit on the basis that the Instate Residency Rule exceptions did not apply to him. OHSAA Bylaw 4-6-3/Instate Residency Rule states that “students whose parents reside outside of Ohio will be ineligible for interscholastic athletics in a member school.” Charles and his parents filed a lawsuit against OHSAA for refusing to grant an accommodation or waiver so Charles could play interscholastic athletics. Charles and his parents argued that the refusal discriminated against Charles on the basis of his disability and violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).
OHSAA argued that it applied a neutral residency requirement that would bar Charles from participating in OHSAA governed sports programs in Ohio, even if he were not disabled. Furthermore, OHSAA argued that Charles was requesting a complete waiver of an essential eligibility rule and not a mere accommodation. The court granted Charles and his parents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and enjoined OHSAA from seeking to enforce OHSAA Bylaw 4-6-3 against Charles. The court ruled that if OHSAA granted the requested waiver to Charles, it would most likely only receive a minimal financial or administrative burden. The court ruled that “granting the narrow waiver requested by Charles and his parents would not fundamentally alter the nature of OHSAA athletics.” Charles could not be excluded from participating in OHSAA regulated athletic programs due to the Instate Residency Rule.
Thanks to John Concannon, Esq., Freking & Betz LLC, Cincinnati, for submitting the above decision.
Fifth Circuit determines that Mississippi school district violated student’s First Amendment rights for off-campus speech posted on YouTube.
Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014).
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/12/12-60264-CV0.pdf
Taylor Bell attended Itawamba Agricultural High School. During December 2010, while school was not in session, Bell composed and recorded a rap song discussing a few female complaints about coaches sexually harassing them. Bell used a personal computer to make the song. Subsequently, Bell uploaded the song to his Facebook page and then to YouTube using a home computer. One of the accused coaches received a text message from his wife after she learned of Bell’s Facebook posting. The coach informed the principal who in turn informed the superintendent. Once classes resumed after the holiday, Bell was removed from class and told that he would be suspended.
During the disciplinary hearing, Bell mentioned that he wrote the song in response to the coaches’ inappropriate behavior, and the song was artistic expression. Bell told the administration that the lyrics to the song were not meant to intimidate, threaten or harass the coaches. There was no evidence presented that reflected the song having caused or forecasting the song to cause a material or substantial disruption to school discipline or work. Additionally, there was no indication that the coaches perceived the song to be an actual threat or disruption. Bell was suspended and placed in an alternative school, and could not attend any school functions for the remainder of the school year. Bell filed a lawsuit against the district, principal and superintendent alleging that his First Amendment rights were violated because he was disciplined for composing, recording and posting his rap song while off-campus. The district court ruled in favor of the district and found that the rap song “substantially disrupted the school’s work and discipline and that it was reasonably foreseeable that the song would cause such a disruption.” Bell appealed.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that there was no substantial disruption and no facts that could have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities. In addition, the court determined there was no commotion, boisterous conduct, class interruption or lack of order. Neither coach felt threatened or in fear as a result of the rap lyrics. The court found that Bell’s First Amendment rights were violated. As a result, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s judgment and ruled in favor of Bell on his First Amendment claim.
Fourth Circuit held that student did not exhaust her administrative remedies under the IDEA when she failed to appeal to both tiers of the state’s two-tiered review process.
E.L. v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Edn., 773 F.3d 509 (4th Cir.2014).
http://www.ncmd.uscourts.gov/sites/ncmd/files/opinions/12cv29moo.pdf
E.L. was a nine-year-old girl with autism. Her parents were dissatisfied with the special education services provided to her by the Chapel Hill-Carrboro Board of Education in North Carolina and filed an administrative complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that the school board violated the IDEA by failing to provide E.L. with required speech therapy. However, in all other respects, the ALJ found her special education program to be appropriate. On the school board’s appeal, a state review officer reversed the ALJ’s conclusion regarding E.L.’s speech therapy, determining that the school board did not violate the IDEA.
On her appeal to the district court, E.L. for the first time appealed the ALJ’s conclusion that, except for its failure to provide required speech therapy for parts of the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 school years, the school board did not violate the IDEA. The district court dismissed E.L.’s claims, holding that because she did not raise the issues before the state review officer, she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
On appeal to the court of appeals, E.L. argued that she was not required under the IDEA to appeal the ALJ’s adverse decision to the state review officer prior to filing suit in the district court. The court of appeals rejected this argument, finding that the IDEA allows states to implement a two-tiered review process where both tiers are administered at the state level. In this case, because E.L. failed to exhaust her administrative remedies at both tiers, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment and dismissed E.L.’s claims.
Second Circuit defers to decision of state authorities in tuition reimbursement case.
Hardinson v. Bd. of Edn. of the Oneonta City Sch. Dist., 773 F.3d 372 (2nd Cir.2014).
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-1594/13-1594-2014-12-03.html
A.N.H. experienced academic difficulties during her freshman year in New York’s Oneonta School District. She was found to have mental health and emotional difficulties and her parents requested an IEP from a Committee on Special Education (CSE), a committee that is responsible for creating IEPs under New York law. The CSE committee determined that a mental health classification for the student would not be optimal, so the district instead added extra supports at the high school and altered A.N.H.’s schedule to split time between the high school and a children’s center. The student’s family felt these changes were insufficient and unilaterally enrolled their daughter at a private board school, without giving the district express notice of their decision to do so. In February 2009, the family filed a due process complaint against the district, arguing, among other things, that A.N.H. had been denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE).
In a hearing before an impartial hearing officer (IHO), the district maintained that the boarding school was not an appropriate placement because some of its teachers were not certified. The IHO found for the parents, finding that the student was denied a FAPE because the IEP developed for her neither placed her in a school nor provided referrals to any private residential programs. The IHO found that the boarding school placement was appropriate and excused the parents’ failure to provide notice to the district. The district appealed the IHO’s decision to the state review officer (SRO).
The SRO reversed the IHO’s decision, concluding that the district did not deny the student a FAPE for the part of the school year because she did not meet disability criteria, and that the boarding school’s programs were not appropriate for her specific educational needs.
The parents challenged the SRO’s decision in district court. Finding that the equities favored private school tuition reimbursement for the parents, the district court found that the SRO placed too great an emphasis on the student’s failing grades at the boarding school and not enough emphasis on her improvement through counseling.
On appeal, the Second Circuit court found that the district court erred in not according the SRO’s determination greater deference. The Second Circuit held that greater deference to SROs was warranted because “state educational authorities possess greater expertise in drawing conclusions from educational proceedings because of their greater institutional competence and role.” The Second Circuit thus reversed the district court’s partial summary judgment ruling and ordered the district court to affirm the SRO’s decision.
Eleventh Circuit rejects district’s Eleventh Amendment immunity defense for claims of retaliation under FMLA and ADA.
Lightfoot v. Henry Cty. Sch. Dist., 771 F.3d 764 (8th Cir.2014).
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201314631.pdf
Zaneta Lightfoot was a high school teacher in Georgia. She suffered from sickle cell anemia and took intermittent leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) during the 2010-2011 school year. In February 2011, administrators met with Lightfoot to give her a disciplinary document called a “letter of redirection.” The letter stated that Lightfoot had neglected her duties and violated specific requirements contained in the district’s teacher evaluation addendum. The administrators stated that Lightfoot’s medical absences had caused many of the problems described in the letter, and suggested that she transfer to a middle school because the high school’s schedule was not compatible with her medical condition. Lightfoot was also removed from her position as the school’s cheerleading coach. Later in the school year, the district moved her English classroom, previously located across the hall from her drama classroom, to the other side of the building. This required Lightfoot to take a painful walk between the distant classrooms. Lightfoot requested an accommodation to reduce her walking, which an administrator denied because Lightfoot “did not appear to him to be in pain.”
After exhausting her administrative remedies under the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Lightfoot filed suit in March 2012, alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and retaliation under the FMLA. The district court granted the district’s motion for summary judgment, based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.
On appeal, the question at issue was whether the district qualified for immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as an “arm of the state” or whether it was more akin to a “county or similar political subdivision.” The court noted that the Supreme Court and a majority of appellate courts did not grant school districts immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. In determining whether the district was entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the court evaluated four factors: 1) how state law defines the entity; 2) what degree of control the state maintains over the entity; 3) where the entity derives its funds; and 4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.
In this case, the court of appeals found that the school district was not an “arm of the state,” but rather a political subdivision with a substantial amount of autonomy over school affairs. Even though the state of Georgia established control via certain requirements, the state only prescribed minimum requirements, which were not sufficient enough to establish Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also acknowledged the district’s local fundraising capabilities, finding that a judgment against the district would not derive from state funds because of the district’s fiscal autonomy from the state. As a result, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.
Eleventh Circuit holds that school boards in Alabama counties are not arms or alter egos of the state, and thus do not have Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Walker v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Edn., 771 F.3d 748 (11th Cir.2014).
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201314182.pdf
In two unrelated cases, school employees brought action against county boards of education, challenging their employment decisions. In Walker v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Edn., a number of “240-day employees” sued the county board of education, alleging that the board’s practice of dividing their annual salaries by 260 days to obtain their hourly and overtime rates violated the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court in Walker granted the county board’s motion to dismiss. In Weaver v. Madison City Bd. of Edn., a member of the United States Army Reserve, sued the board of education alleging that after his nearly two-year tour of duty in Afghanistan, the board refused to reinstate him to his prior position. The district court in Weaver denied the board’s motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The cases were appealed and consolidated.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the court’s dismissal of the complaint in Walker and affirmed the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss Weaver. The court held that whether an entity is an “arm of the state” depends on the particular function in which the entity was engaged when taking the actions out of which the liability was asserted to have arisen. In these cases, the “functions” involved employment-related decisions (i.e. hiring, assignment, and compensation). The court held that because of the autonomy provided to local school boards (e.g. determining its own policy, prescribing rules and regulations for the schools, suspending or dismissing employees, etc.), there was little weight to the argument that the board was an “arm of the state” and thereby entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also acknowledged that because the state legislature specifically vested in county boards of education the authority to transfer, suspend, or dismiss teachers, the board was not an “arm of the state.” As a result, the court of appeals found that the county boards were not immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suits challenging employment-related decisions.
Georgia court of appeals determines that parents’ negligence may be the cause of student’s misconduct.
Boston v. Athearn, 764 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. 2014).
http://www.courthousenews.com/2014/10/14/Facebook%20Defamation.pdf
Thirteen-year-old Dustin Athearn and his friend Melissa Snodgrass created a fake Facebook page for their classmate Alex Boston. Dustin posed as Alex on Facebook and used an altered photo that he had taken of her for the profile picture. He used his family’s computer to set up the profile. Dustin and Melissa added information that indicated racist views, sexual postings, false health information and homosexual orientation, which were all unauthorized. In addition, Dustin and Melissa sent out friend requests to classmates, teachers and extended family members from the fake Facebook page.
Once the page was discovered, Alex’s parents went to the school’s principal. Dustin and Melissa admitted their involvement and were suspended. Dustin’s parents disciplined him for his actions. However, the fake Facebook page remained accessible until Facebook officials deactivated the account. Alex’s parents then filed a lawsuit alleging that Dustin defamed Alex. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dustin’s parents, and Alex’s parents appealed.
Alex’s parents argued that Dustin’s parents were negligent in failing to compel Dustin to remove the fake Facebook page once they were alerted of what was occurring. The court of appeals found that a reasonable jury could determine that after learning of Dustin’s misconduct of creating the fake Facebook page, his parents failed to exercise due care in supervising and controlling his computer activities going forward. However, Dustin’s parents could not be liable for failing to take down the fake Facebook page based upon the fact that it was created on their home computer. Additionally, the court ruled that a jury could find that Dustin’s parents negligence proximately caused some part of Alex’s injuries because the false and offensive statements remained on display and continued to be available on Facebook. As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in part and reversed in part.
Third Circuit determines that school district is not entitled to qualified immunity against former employee’s retaliation claim.
Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 772 F.3d 979 (3rd Cir. 2014).
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/133868p.pdf
Francis Dougherty worked as the Deputy Chief Business Officer for Operations and Acting Chief of Operations for the Office of the Deputy Superintendent in the School District of Philadelphia. Dougherty reported to the deputy superintendent who in turn reported to the superintendent. He was responsible for the district’s Office of Capital Programs (OCP). In September 2012, the superintendent directed OCP to install new security cameras across the district. Dougherty was told to lead the procurement process. Since there was a short time period, OCP could not use the competitive bidding process, which caused it to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty and his team chose Security and Data Technologies (SDT). Dougherty’s team prepared a proposal and submitted a resolution to the deputy superintendent for review. The district’s policy required the superintendent to approve the resolution before it was submitted to the School Reform Commission (SRC) for final approval. The superintendent rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation and ordered a minority-owned firm be awarded the contract, although the firm was not pre-qualified. The superintendent removed Dougherty from the project and blamed him for obstructing the minority-owned firm’s work.
Dougherty met with reporters from the Philadelphia Inquirer regarding the superintendent’s alleged wrongdoing in awarding the minority owned firm the contract. Several articles were published about the alleged wrongdoing. In addition, Dougherty provided a report to the FBI’s website and contacted state representatives regarding the alleged wrongdoing. Dougherty was placed on administrative leave while the superintendent investigated who leaked the information.
Dougherty was terminated. He filed a suit and alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for disclosing the superintendent’s alleged misconduct. The district court ruled in favor of Dougherty finding that the allegations were sufficient to establish a retaliation claim, and therefore the district was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court of appeals found that Dougherty was not speaking pursuant to his official duties when he disclosed information about the superintendent’s alleged wrongdoing. His position did not require him to provide this type of information. Therefore, the information he provided to the Philadelphia Inquirer was made as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. The district argued that the information that Dougherty provided was gained from special knowledge and experience and was related to his professional duties.
The court of appeals denied the district’s claim for qualified immunity because Dougherty was speaking as a concerned citizen, and a reasonable jury could determine that his speech would have had a minimal disruption had the district not suspended and fired Dougherty.
New Jersey court determines that former custodian pled facts sufficient enough for a claim of retaliation against school district.
Bobo v. Wildwood Pub. Sch. Bd. of Edn., D.Ct. NJ. No. 13-5007 (RBK/KMW) (Dec. 23, 2014).
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1294674106185594009&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr
Lance Bobo worked as a custodian for the Wildwood Board of Education. In November 2005, Bobo complained to his supervisor, Patrick Quinlan, that certain records were being falsified. Bobo alleged that Quinlan became upset and assigned Bobo to perform additional tasks that others did not have to perform. Since Quinlan did not address the complaint regarding the falsified records, Bobo reported the falsified records to the superintendent. Bobo also alleged that Quinlan mismanaged funds and that employees acted inappropriately towards students. Since Bobo’s complaints were not being resolved, he reported the issues to the Cape May County Superintendent’s Office as well as the New Jersey Office of Fiscal Accountability and Compliance.
In December 2011, Bobo left work due to high blood pressure. He was out of work for five days. He then told Quinlan and others that he was unable to report to work due to stress-induced headaches. He was then notified that he would be suspended with pay, pending the results of a fitness for duty evaluation. The district required Bobo to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. A few weeks after Bobo returned to work, he was terminated. Bobo filed a lawsuit against the district alleging violation of his First Amendment rights.
The court found that Bobo sufficiently pled a First Amendment retaliation claim against Quinlan because Quinlan began retaliating against Bobo for his complaints about the falsification of records. Quinlan continued to harass Bobo for years to follow and also allegedly issued him bogus disciplinary actions as a result. Additionally, the court determined that Quinlan recommended Bobo for termination after Bobo reported Quinlan’s retaliatory conduct. The court also found that the board secretary’s requirement for Bobo to undergo a psychiatric evaluation was retaliatory in motive. As a result, the court denied the motion to dismiss Bobo’s retaliation claims.
Colorado court determines that estate of student teacher failed to establish a pretext for retaliation after termination.
Estate of Carlos Bassatt v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 in the City and Cty. of Denver, 10th Cir. No. 13-1244 (Dec. 31, 2014).
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1244.pdf
Carlos Bassatt, a man of Puerto Rican decent, was a student teacher and substitute teacher at West High School. On September 14, 2007, Bassatt exited the school building and got into his Ford Focus and reclined his seat. Maria Iams, a district employee, alleged that she parked her car next to a Ford Focus and saw a Hispanic man masturbating. The incident was reported to the school resource office (SRO), and Iams was questioned. Iams also reviewed the surveillance video of the parking lot, but she was unable to identify the man in the video. The principal, who is Latino, met with the SRO and Bassatt and informed him that he was accused of masturbating in his car. Bassatt denied the allegations. The SRO gave Bassatt a summons to appear at the police department. However, Bassatt was not charged with a crime.
The principal emailed Bassatt and informed him that it was okay to return to the school since the charges weren’t substantiated. The district’s director of labor relations told the principal that the district could still take action against Bassatt for his alleged misconduct. When Bassatt met with the principal and director of labor relations he admitted that he was reclining in his seat in the parking lot, but denied masturbating. He alleged that the allegation against him was racially motivated. Bassatt’s student teaching placement was subsequently terminated because of the allegation. Bassatt filed a lawsuit against the district alleging race discrimination and retaliation. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Bassatt did not establish discrimination or retaliation because he failed to establish the circumstances giving rise to unlawful discrimination, and he did not establish a prima facie case for retaliation. Bassatt appealed the retaliation claim to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (CCRC). The CCRC reversed the ALJ’s determination and ruled that Bassatt established a prima facie case of retaliation. The district appealed. After several court hearings, during which time Bassatt passed away and his estate entered as the plaintiff, the district court found that the estate failed to establish a pretext for the retaliation claim. Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the district.
On appeal, the court of appeals found that Bassatt’s estate did not “provide sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue on pretext since the principal adequately investigated the incident.” In addition, the court of appeals found that the principal honestly believed that Bassatt engaged in the misconduct, and Bassatt did not have an employment contract with the district to bind the district. As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment.
Ohio court determines that two year statute of limitation bars former student’s relief.
Doe v Centerville City Sch.’s Bd. of Edn., Montgomery C.P. No. 2014 CV 01712 (Dec. 23, 2014).
Lauren Kain attended Centerville High School from 2003-2007. During that time, Michael Weaver was one of her teachers. Kain alleged that Weaver took advantage of his authority and involved her in an ongoing sexual relationship for which she was unable to consent because she was a minor. Subsequently, Kain denied the allegations. A guidance counselor and principal failed to report the relationship allegations between Kain and Weaver to the police, children’s services or Kain’s parents. Kain alleged that the defendants acted with reckless indifference by covering up accusations. After graduating from Centerville High School and learning that another student was involved in a sexual relationship with Weaver, Kain reported her story to the police.
Subsequently, Weaver pled guilty to sexual battery by a teacher. Kain then filed a complaint against the defendants. The defendants argued that Kain’s claims were barred by the two year statue of limitations under RC 2744.04(A). Additionally, the defendants contended that Kain’s claims were statutorily-tolled until Kain reached the age of majority and once she reached that age she only had two years to file her claims, which she failed to do.
The court found that RC 2744.04(A) has a special two year statute of limitations that applies to a political subdivision and its employees that prevails over the general statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse under RC 2305.111(C). The court noted that the two year statute of limitations under RC 2744.04(A) applies to political subdivisions and their employees that are performing a governmental function. In this case, Kain brought an action against the board, guidance counselor and high school principal. The statute of limitations claims were statutorily-tolled until Kain reached the age of majority. Once Kain reached that age, she only had two years to file her claims. Kain graduated in 2007 and did not file an action until seven years after she reached the age of majority. The statute of limitations barred her claims for relief in this case. In addition, Kain’s allegations for the defendants failure to report the abuse while Kain was a student could not be brought under RC 2151.421(M), due to preclusion against “retroactive application to the claim.” The court dismissed Kain’s claims and ruled in favor of the defendants.
Thanks to Beverly Meyer, Esq., Cooper, Gentile, Washington & Meyer, Dayton, for submitting the above decision.
Ohio court of appeals holds that board members’ emails were not a meeting about official business subject to public disclosure under Ohio’s Open Meetings Act.
White v. King, 2014-Ohio-3896.
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/5/2014/2014-ohio-3896.pdf
In March 2012, Adam White, a school board member for the Olentangy Local School District Board of Education, commenced an independent investigation into certain expenditures by two athletic directors. As a result of the investigation, one athletic director resigned and both were required to reimburse the district for improper spending. In September 2012, the board voted to require that all future communications between board members and staff must first pass through the district superintendent or treasurer. White was the only board member who voted against the proposal.
In October 2012, the Columbus Dispatch published an editorial that criticized the board’s policies restricting direct access by board members to administrators and personnel and favorably mentioned White’s decision to vote against the proposal. The board president, David King, proposed that a public response to the Dispatch editorial be made. A series of emails between King, the remaining board members (sans White) and certain district employees resulted in a response that was submitted to the Dispatch. Only the board president signed the final response.
In April 2013, White filed a lawsuit against the board, alleging violations of Ohio’s Open Meeting statute. In January 2014, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting the district’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that there was no prearranged discussion between board members, nor was there a pending rule or resolution before the board. As a result, there was no violation of RC 121.22. White appealed.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Relying on a similar case from another district, the court noted that the statute, although amended in 2002, failed to mention modern electronic communications, such as emails. If the legislature had intended for the term “meeting” to include emails, it would have said so, concluded the court. As a result, the court held that the board did not violate Ohio’s Open Meetings Act.
White has appealed this decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, where it is still pending.
Eleventh Circuit rules that school district had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to nonrenew teacher’s contract based on her teaching and classroom management abilities.
Fong v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., Florida, 11th Cir. No.13-10393 (Nov. 11, 2014).
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/files/201310393.pdf
Jianxin Fong, who is of Chinese decent, taught math at Boynton Beach High School (BBHS) and was hired on an annual contract basis. The principal conducted a brief observation of Fong on September 25, 2008, and told her that she had a very strong accent. The principal also commented that the students didn’t understand her nor did the principal. During the 2008-2009 school year, the BBHS administrators expressed concern over Fong’s classroom management abilities. They believed Fong struggled with managing her students’ conduct, and her students were not consistently engaged in learning. In April 2009, Fong received a letter informing her that her contract would not be renewed. The principal told Fong she was not fit for the school. Fong filed a lawsuit against the district alleging discrimination. The trial court ruled in favor of the district.
On appeal, Fong argued that she was treated differently on the basis of her national origin. The court of appeals highlighted the fact that an employee’s heavy accent or difficulty speaking English can be a legitimate basis for an adverse employment action when effective communication skills are reasonably related to a person’s job performance. In this case, the principal’s comment that Fong could not be understood did not constitute blatant remarks amounting to discrimination on the basis of Fong’s national origin. The principal had a legitimate interest to ensure that Fong’s students were able to understand her in the classroom. The court found no direct evidence of discrimination. The district argued that Fong’s work performance was not up to par and her teaching style was not the best method to engage the students, and that is why she was nonrenewed. The administrators were concerned with Fong’s classroom management as evidenced through their observations. Fong was unable to establish any discriminatory reasoning for the nonrenewal of her contract. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Alabama employee’s retaliation claim fails due to her failure to show an adverse employment action.
Witt v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Edn., N.D. Ala. No. 3:14-CV_01395-AKK (Dec. 19, 2014).
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-alnd-3_11-cv-01031/pdf/USCOURTS-alnd-3_11-cv-01031-0.pdf
Resa Witt filed a lawsuit against the Franklin County Board of Education in Alabama, asserting retaliation in violation of Title VII. According to Witt, after she filed a lawsuit against the board in March 2011, the board retaliated against her by: 1) placing her on the work duty schedule twice in a six-week period instead of just once like her coworkers; 2) placing her on the busy duty schedule after she informed school administration that she had several medical conditions that made it difficult and dangerous for her to stand for long periods of time; and 3) formally reprimanding her after she called the police to her classroom in response to a student verbally threatening her.
The board argued that Witt’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Witt didn’t show that she had suffered an adverse employment action. The court agreed with the board, finding that Witt had not pleaded any reduction in salary, change in terms, conditions or benefits of employment, or difference in work description or work location. She was asked to do slightly more work than similarly situated colleagues and to perform duties that were within her job description. The court also highlighted that being reprimanded for cause doesn’t rise to the level of an adverse employment action. Because none of the alleged actions undertaken by the board would have dissuaded a reasonable person from making or supporting a charge of discrimination, the court held that Witt’s complaint did not support a plausible claim for retaliation under Title VII and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.